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Some Non-Religious Views against 
Proposed "Mercy-Killing" Legislation 
Yale Kamisar 
PART II 
A Long Range View of Euthanasia 
A. Voluntary v. Involuntary Euthanasia 
EVER SINCE the 1870's, when what was probably the first eutha-
nasia debate of the modern era took place/50 most proponents of 
the movement-at least when they are pressed-have taken consid-
erable pains to restrict the question to the plight of the unbearably 
suffering who voluntarily seeks death while most of their opponents 
have striven equally hard to frame the issue in terms which would 
encompass certain involuntary situations as well, e.g., the "congenital 
idiots," the "permanently insane," and the senile. 
Glanville Williams reflects the outward mood of many euthana-
siasts when he scores those who insist on considering the question 
from a broader angle: 
The [English Society's] bill [debated in the House of Lords in 1936 a~d 
1950] excluded any question of compulsory euthanasia, even for hopelessly 
defective infants. Unfortunately, a legislative proposal is not assured of 
success merely because it is worded in a studiously moderate and restrictive 
form. The method of attack, by those who dislike the proposal, is to use 
the 'thin edge of the wedge' argument. . . . There is no proposal for reform 
on any topic, however conciliatory and moderate, that cannot be opposed 
by this dialectic.151 
Why was the bill "worded in a studiously moderate and restrictive 
form"? If it were done as a matter of principle, if it were done in 
recognition of the ethico-moral-legal "wall of separation" which 
stands between voluntary and compulsory "mercy killings," much 
can be said for the euthanasiasts' lament about the methods em-
ployed by the opposition. But if it were done as a matter of political 
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expediency-with great hopes and expectations of pushing through 
a second and somewhat less restrictive bill as soon as the first one had 
sufficiently "educated" public opinion and next a third still less re-
strictive bill-what standing do the euthanasiasts then have to attack 
the methods of the opposition? No cry of righteous indignation could 
ring more hollow, I would think, than the protest from those utilizing 
the "wedge" principle themselves that their opponents are making 
the wedge objection. 
In this regard the words and action of the euthanasiasts are not 
insignificant. 
No sooner had the English Society been organized and a drive to 
attain "easy death" legislation launched than Dr. Harry Roberts, one 
of the most distinguished sympathizers of the movement, disclosed 
some basis for alarm as to how far the momentum would carry: 
So far as its defined objects go, most informed people outside the 
Catholic Church will be in general sympathy with the new Society; but 
lovers of personal liberty may feel some of that suspicion which proved so 
well justified when the Eugenics movement was at its most enthusiastic 
height. 
In the course of the discussion at the [1935] Royal Sanitary Institute 
Congress, two distinguished doctors urged the desirability of legalizing the 
painless destruction of 'human mental monstt:osities' in whom improve-
ment is unattainable; and at the inaugural meeting of the Euthanasia 
Legislation Society, the Chairman of the Executive Committee said that 
. . . they were concerned today only with voluntary euthanasia; but, 
as public opinion developed, and it became possible to form a truer 
estimate of the value of human life, further progress along preventive 
lines would be possible. . . . The population was an aging one, with a 
larger relative proportion of elderly persons-individuals who had 
reached a degenerative stage of life. Thus the total amount of suffering 
and the number of useless lives must increase. 
We need to discriminate very carefully between facilitating the death of 
an individual at his own request and for his own relief, and the killing 
of an individual on the ground that, for the rest of us, such a course would 
be more economical or more agreeable than keeping him alive.1112 
In the 1936 debate in the House of Lords, Lord Ponsonby of 
Shulbrede, who moved the second reading of the voluntary eutha-
nasia bill, described two appealing actual cases, one where a man 
drowned his four year old daughter "who had contracted tuberculosis 
and had developed gangrene in the face,"1113 another where a woman 
killed her mother who was suffering from "general paralysis of the 
insane."154 Both cases of course were of the compulsory variety of 
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euthanasia. True, Lord Ponsonby readily admitted that these cases 
were not covered by the proposed bill, but the fact remains that they 
were the only specific cases he chose to describe. 
In 1950, Lord Chorley once again called the voluntary euthanasia 
bill to the attention of the House of Lords. He was most articulate, 
if not too discreet, on excluding compulsory euthanasia cases from 
coverage: 
Another objection is that the Bill does not go far enough, because it 
applies only to adults and does not apply to children who come into the 
world deaf, dumb and crippled, and who have a much better cause than 
those for whom the Bill provides. That may be so, but we must go step 
by step.155 
In 1938, two years after the English Society was organized and its 
bill had been introduced into the House of Lords, the Euthanasia 
Society of America was formed. 156 At its first annual meeting the 
following year, it offered proposed euthanasia legislation: 
Infant imbeciles, hopelessly insane persons . . . and any person not 
requesting his own death would not come within the scope of the proposed 
act. 
Charles E. Nixdorff, New York lawyer and treasurer of the society, who 
offered the bill for consideration, explained to some of the members who 
desired to broaden the scope of the proposed law, that it was limited 
purposely to voluntary euthanasia because public opinion is not ready to 
accept the broader principle. He said, however, that the soCiety hoped 
eventually to legalize the putting to death of nonvolunteers beyond the 
help of medical science.157 
About this time, apparently, the Society began to circulate litera~ 
ture in explanation and support of voluntary euthanasia, as follows: 
The American and English Euthanasia Societies, after careful considera-
tion, have both decided that more will be accomplished by devoting their 
efforts at present to the measure which will probably encounter the least 
opposition, namely voluntary euthanasia. The public is readier to recog-
nize the right to die than the right to kill, even though the latter be in 
mercy. To take someone's life without his consent is a very different thing 
from granting him release from unnecessary suffering at his own express 
desire. The freedom of the individual is highly prized in democracies.158 
The American Society's own "Outline of the Euthanasia Movement 
in the United States and England" states in part: 
1941. A questionnaire was sent to all physicians of New York State 
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asking ( 1) Are you in favor of legalizing voluntary euthanasia for incurable 
adult sufferers? (2) Are you in favor of legalizing euthanasia for congenital 
monstrosities, idiots and imbeciles? Because only one-third as many physi-
cians answered 'yes' to question 2 as to question 1, we decided that we 
would limit our program to voluntary euthanasia.159 
At a meeting of the Society of Medical Jurisprudence held several 
weeks after the American Society voluntary euthanasia bill had been 
drafted, Dr. Foster Kennedy, newly elected president of the society, 
... urged the legalizing of euthanasia primarily in cases of born defectives 
who are doomed to remain defective, rather than for normal persons who 
have become miserable through incurable illness [and scored the] absurd 
and misplaced sentimental kindness [that seeks to preserve the life of a] 
person who is not a person. If the law sought to restrict euthanasia to 
those who could speak out for it, and thus overlooked these creatures who 
cannot speak, then, I say as Dickens did, 'The law's an ass.'160 
As pointed out elsewhere, while president of the Society, Dr. Ken-
nedy not only eloquently advocated involuntary euthanasia but 
strenuously opposed the voluntary variety.161 Is it any wonder that 
opponents of the movement do not always respect the voluntary-
involuntary dichotomy? 
At the same time that Dr. Kennedy was disseminating his "per-
sonal'' views, Dr. A. L. Wolbarst, long a stalwart in the movement, 
was adhering much more closely to the party line. In a persuasive 
address to medical students published in a leading medical journal 
he pointed out that 
... a bill is now in preparation for introduction in the New York State 
Legislature aqthorizing the administration of euthanasia to incurable 
sufferers on their own request162 [and stressed that] the advocates of 
voluntary euthanasia do not seek to impose it on any one who does not 
ask for it. It is intended as an act of mercy for those who need it and 
demand it.163 
What were Dr. Wolbarst's views before the English and American 
societies had been organized and substantial agreement reached as 
to the party platform? Four years earlier, in a debate on euthanasia, 
he stated: 
The question as usually submitted limits the discussion of legal eutha-
nasia to those 'incurables whose physical suffering is unbearable to them-
selves.' That limitation is rather unfortunate, because the number of 
incurables within this category is actually and relatively extremely small. 
Very few incurables have or express the wish to die. However great their 
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physical suffering may be ... they prefer to live. 
If legal euthanasia has a humane and merciful motivation, it seems to 
me the entire question should be considered from a broad angle. There are 
times when euthanasia is strongly indicated as an act of mercy even 
though the subject's suffering is not 'unbearable to himself,' as in the case 
of an imbecile. 
It goes without saying that, in recently developed cases with a possibility 
of cure, euthanasia should not even be considered; but when insane or 
defective people have suffered mental incapacity and tortures of the mind 
for many years-forty-three years in a case of my personal knowledge-
euthanasia certainly has proper field. 164 
In his 1939 address, Dr. Wolbarst also quoted in full the stirring 
suicide message of Charlotte Perkins Gilman, 
... described as one of the twelve greatest American women [who] had 
been in failing health for several years and chose self-euthanasia rather 
than endure the pains of cancer.165 
He would have presented Mrs. Gilman's views more fully if he had 
quoted as well from her last article, left with her agent to be pub-
lished after her death, where she advocates euthanasia for "incurable 
invalids," "hopeless idiots," "helpless paretics," and "certain grades 
of criminals. 01166 Citing with approval the experience of "practical 
Germany," Miss Gilman's article asserted that 
... the dragging weight of the grossly unfit and dangerous could be 
lightened [by legalized euthanasia,] with great advantage to the normal and 
progressive. The millions spent in restraining and maintaining social 
detritus should be available for the safeguarding and improving of better 
lives.167 
· In 1950, the "mercy killings" perpetrated by Dr. Herman N. Sander 
on his cancer-stricken patient and by Miss Carol Ann Paight on 
her cancer-stricken father put the euthanasia question on page 
one.168 In the midst of the fervor over these cases, Dr. Clarence Cook 
Little, one of the leaders in the movement and a former president of 
the American Society, suggested specific safeguards for a law legal-
izing "mercy killings" for the "incurably ill but mentally fit" and for 
"mental defectives.'0169 The Reverend Charles Francis Potter, the 
founder and first president of the American Society, hailed Dr. San-
der's action as "morally right" and hence that which "should be le-
gally right.'0170 Shortly thereafter, at its annual meeting, the American 
Society "voted to continue support" of both Dr. Sander and Miss 
Paight.171 
Now, one of the interesting, albeit underplayed, features of these 
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cases-and this was evident all along-was that both were involun-
tary "mercy killings." There was considerable conflict in the testi-
mony at the Sander Trial as to whether or not the victim's husband 
had pleaded with the doctor to end her suffering,172 but nobody 
claimed that the victim herself had done such pleading. There was 
considerable evidence in the PaightJ case to the effect that the victim's 
daughter had a "cancer phobia," the cancer deaths of two aunts hav-
ing left a deep mark on her,173 but nobody suggested that the victim 
had a "cancer phobia." 
It is true that Mother Paight said approvingly of her "mercy kill-
ing" daughter that "she had the old Paight guts,"174 but it is no less 
true that Father Paight had no opportunity to pass judgment on the 
question. He was asleep, still under the anesthetic of the exploratory 
operation which revealed the cancer in his stomach when his daugh-
ter, after having taken one practice shot in the woods, fired into his 
left temple.175 Is it not just possible that Father Paight would have 
preferred to have had the vaunted Paight intestinal fortitude chan-
neled in other directions, e.g., by his daughter bearing to see him 
suffer?176 
The Sander and Paight cases amply demonstrate that to the press, 
the public, and many euthanasiasts, the killing of one who does not 
or cannot speak is no less a "mercy killing" than the killing of one 
who asks for death. Indeed, the overwhelming majority of known 
or alleged "mercy killings" have occurred without the consent of the 
victim. If the Sander and Paight cases are atypical at all, they are so 
only in that the victims were not ill or retarded children, as in the 
Simpson, 177 Brownhill118 and Long119 English cases and the Green-
field/80 Repouille,un Noxon 182 and Braunsdorjl83 American cases. 
These situations are all quite moving. So much so that two of the 
strongest presentations of the need for voluntary euthanasia, free 
copies of which may be obtained from the American Society, lead off 
with sympathetic discussions of the Brownhill and Greenfield cases.184 
This, it need hardly be said, is not the way to honor the voluntary-
involuntary boundary. Not the way to ease the pressure to legalize 
at least this type of involuntary euthanasia as well if any changes in 
the broad area are to be made at all. 
Nor, it should be noted, is Williams free from criticism in this 
regard. In his discussion of "the present law," apparently a discussion 
of voluntary euthanasia, he cites only one case, Simpson, an involun-
tary situation.185 In his section on "the administration of the law" he· 
describes only the Sander case and the "compassionate acquittal" of 
a man who drowned his four year old daughter, a sufferer of tuber-
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culosis and gangrene of the face.186 Again, both are involuntary 
cases. For "some other" American "mercy killing" cases, Williams 
refers generally to an article by Helen Silving, 187 but two of the three 
cases he seems to have in mind are likewise cases of involuntary 
euthanasia. 188 
That the press and general public are not alone in viewing an act 
as a "mercy killing," lack of consent on the part of the victim not-
withstanding, is well evidenced by the recent deliberations of the 
Royal Commission on Capital Punishment.189 The Report itself de-
scribed "mercy killings" as "for example, where a mother has killed 
her child or a husband has killed his wife from merciful motives of 
pity and humanity."190 The only specific proposal to exclude "mercy 
killings" from the category of murder discussed in the Report is a 
suggestion by the Society of Labour Lawyers which disregards the 
voluntary-involuntary distinction~ 
If a person who has killed another person proves that he killed that 
person with the compassionate intention of saving him physical or mental 
suffering he shall not be guilty of murder.191 
Another proposal, one by Hector Hughes, M.P., to the effect that 
only those who "maliciously" cause the death of another shall be 
guilty of murder,192 likewise treated the voluntary and involuntary 
"mercy killer" as one and the same. 
Testimony before the Commission underscored the great appeal 
of the involuntary "mercy killings." Thus, Lord Goddard, the Lord 
Chief Justice referred to the famous Brownhill case, which he himself 
had tried some fifteen years earlier, as "a dreadfully pathetic case.mes 
"The son," he pointed out, "was a hopeless imbecile, more than im-
becile, a mindless idiot."194 
Mr. Justice Humphreys recalled "one case that was the most pa-
thetic sight I ever saw,"19~ a case which literally had the trial judge, 
Mr. Justice Hawkins, in tears. It involved a young father who smoth-
ered his infant child to death when he learned the child had con-
tracted syphilis from the mother (whose morals turned out to be 
something less than represented) and would be blind for life. "That," 
Mr. Justice Humphreys told the Commission, "was a real 'mercy 
killing.' "196 
The boldness and daring which characterizes most of Glanville 
Williams' book dims perceptibly when he comes to involuntary eu-
thanasia proposals. As to the senile, he states: 
At present the problem has certainly not reached the degree of serious-
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ness that would warrant an effort being made to change traditional attitudes 
toward the sanctity of life of the aged. Only the grimmest necessity could 
bring about a change that, however cautious in its approach, would prob-
ably cause apprehension and deep distress to many people, and infiict a 
traumatic injury upon the accepted code of behaviour built up by two 
thousand years of the Christian religion. It may be, however, that as the 
problem becomes more acute it will itself cause a reversal of generally 
accepted values.197 
To me, this passage is the most startling one in the book. On page 
348 Williams invokes "traditional attitudes towards the sanctity of 
life" and "the accepted code of behavior built up by two thousand 
years of the Christian religion" to check the extension of euthanasia 
to the senile, but for 347 pages he had been merrily rolling along 
debunking both~ Substitute "cancer victim" for "the aged" and Wil-
liams' passage is essentially the argument of many of his opponents 
on the voluntary euthanasia question. 
The unsupported comment that "the problem [of senility] has 
certainly not reached the degree of seriousness" to warrant eutha-
nasia is also rather puzzling, particularly coming as it does after an 
observation by. Williams on the immediately preceding page that 
. . . it is increasingly common for men and women to reach an age of 
'second childishness and mere oblivion,' with a loss of almost all adult 
faculties except that of digestion.198 
How "serious" does a problem have to be to warrant a change in 
these "traditional attitudes"? If, as the statement seems to indicate, 
"seriousness" of a problem is to be determined numerically, the prob-
lem of the cancer victim does not appear to be as substantial as the 
problem of the senile.199 For example, taking just the 95,837 first 
admissions to "public prolonged-care hospitals" for mental diseases 
in the United States in 1955, 23,561--or one fourth-were cerebral 
arteriosclerosis or senile brain disease cases.200 I am not at all sure 
that there are 20,000 cancer victims per year who die unbearably 
painful deaths. Even if there were, I cannot believe that among their 
ranks are some 20,000 per year who, when still in a rational state, 
so long for a quick and easy death that they would avail themselves 
of legal machinery for euthanasia.201 
If the problem of the incurable cancer victim "has reached the 
degree of seriousness that would warrant an effort being made to 
change traditional attitudes toward the sanctity of life," as Williams 
obviously thinks it has, then so has the problem of senility. In any 
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event, the senility problems will undoubtedly soon reach even Wil-
liams' requisite degree of seriousness: 
A decision concerning the senile may have to be taken within the next 
twenty years. The number of old people are increasing by leaps and 
bounds. Pneumonia, 'the old man's friend' is now checked by antibiotics. 
The effects of hardship, exposure, starvation and accident are now mini-
mized. Where is this leading us? . . . What of the drooling, helpless, 
disorientated old man or the doubly incontinent old woman lying log-like 
in bed? Is it here that the real need for euthanasia exists?202 
If, as Williams indicates, "seriousness" of the problem is a major 
criterion for euthanatizing a category of unfortunates, the sum total 
of mentally deficient persons would appear to warrant high priority, 
indeed.203 
When Williams turns to the plight of the "hopelessly defective in-
fants," his characteristic vim and vigor are, as in the senility discus-
sion, conspicuously absent: 
While the Euthanasia Society of England has never advocated this, the 
Euthanasia Society of America did include it in its original program. The 
proposal certainly escapes the chief objection to the similar proposal for 
senile dementia: it does not create a sense of insecurity in society, because 
infants cannot, like adults, feel anticipatory dread of being done to death 
if their condition should worsen. Moreover, the proposal receives some 
support on eugenic grounds, and more importantly on humanitarian 
grounds-both on account of the parents, to whom the child will be a 
burden all their lives, and on account of the handicapped child itself. (It 
is not, however, proposed that any child should be destroyed against the 
wishes of its parents.) Finally, the legalization of euthanasia for handi-
capped children would bring the law into closer relation to its practical 
administration, because juries do not regard parental mercy killing as 
murder. For these various reasons the proposal to legalize humanitarian 
· infanticide is put forward from time to time by individuals. They remain 
in a very small minority, and the proposal may at present be dismissed 
as politically insignificant.204 
It is understandable for a reformer to limit his present proposals 
for change to those with a real prospect of success. But it is hardly 
reassuring for Williams to cite the fact that only "a very small mi-
nority" has urged euthanasia for "hopelessly defective infants" as the 
only reason for not pressing for such legislation now. If, as Williams 
sees it, the only advantage voluntary euthanasia has over the in-
voluntary variety lies in the organized movements on its behalf, that 
advantage can readily be wiped out. 
In any event, I do not think that such "a very small minority" has 
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advocated "humanitarian infanticide." Until the organization of the 
English and American societies led to a concentration on the volun-
tary type, and until the by-products of the Nazi euthanasia program 
somewhat embarrassed, if only temporarily, most proponents of in-
voluntary euthanasia, about as many writers urged one type as an-
other.205 Indeed, some euthanasiasts have taken considerable pains 
to demonstrate the superiority of defective infant euthanasia over 
incurably ill eutlianasia. 206 
As for dismissing euthanasia of defective infants as "politically 
insignificant," the only poll that I know of which measured the public 
response to both types of euthanasia revealed that 45 percent favored 
euthanasia for defective infants under certain conditions while only 
37.3 percent approved euthanasia for the incurably and painfully ill 
under any conditions.201 Furthermore, of those who favored the 
"mercy killing" cure for incurable adults, some 40 percent would 
require only family permission or medical board approval, but not 
the patient's permission.208 
Nor do I think it irrelevant that while public resistance caused 
Hitler to yield on the adult euthanasia front, the killing of malformed 
and idiot children continued unhindered to the end of the war, the 
definition of "children" expanding all the while.209 Is it the embar-
rassing experience of the Nazi euthanasia program which has ren-
dered destruction of defective infants presently "politically insignifi-
cant"? If so, is it any more of a jump from the incurably and pain-
fully ill to the unorthodox political thinker than it is from the hope-
lessly defective infant to the same "unsavory character"? Or is it not 
so much that the euthanasiasts are troubled by the Nazi experience 
as it is that they are troubled that the public is troubled by the Nazi 
experience? 
I read Williams' comments on defective infants for the proposition 
that there are some very good reasons for euthanatizing defective 
infants, but the time is not yet ripe. When will it be? When will the 
proposal become politically significant? After a voluntary euthanasia 
law is on the books and public opinion is sufficiently "educated"? 
Williams' reasons for not extending euthanasia--once we legalize 
it in the narrow "voluntary" area-to the senile and the defective 
are much less forceful and much less persuasive than his arguments 
for legalizing voluntary euthanasia in the first place. I regard this as 





Look, when the messenger cometh, shut the door, and hold him fast at 
the door; is not the sound of his master's feet behind him?210 
This is the "wedge principle," the "parade of horrors" objection 
if you will, to voluntary euthanasia. Glanville Williams' peremptory 
retort is: 
This use of the 'wedge' objection evidently involves a particular deter-
mination as to the meaning of words, namely the words 'if raised to a 
general line of conduct.' The author supposes, for the sake of argument, 
that the merciful extinction of life in a suffering patient is Dot in itself 
immoral. Still it is immoral, because if it were permitted this would admit 
'a most dangerous wedge that might eventually put all life in a precarious 
condition.' It seems a sufficient reply to say that this type of reasoning 
could be used to condemn any act whatever, because there is no human 
conduct from which evil cannot be imagined to follow if it is persisted in 
when some of the circumstances are changed. All moral questions involve 
the drawing of a line, but the 'wedge principle' would make it impossible 
to draw a line, because the line would have to be pushed farther and 
farther back until all action became vetoed.211 
I agree with Williams that if a first step is "moral" it is moral wher-
ever a second step may take us. The real point, however, the point 
that Williams sloughs, is that whether or not the first step is pre-
carious, is perilous, is worth taking, rests in part on what the second 
step is likely to be. 
It is true that the "wedge" objection can always be advanced, the 
horrors can always be paraded. But it is no less true that on some 
occasions the objection is much more valid than it is on others. One 
reason why the "parade of horrors" cannot be too lightly dismissed 
in this particular instance is that Miss Voluntary Euthanasia is not 
likely to be going it alone for very long. Many of her admirers, as 
I have endeavored to show in the. preceding section, would be neither 
surprised nor distressed to see her joined by Miss Euthanatize the 
Congenital Idiots and Miss Euthanatize the Permanently Insane and 
Miss Euthanatize the Senile Dementia. And these lasses-whether 
or not they themselves constitute a "parade of horrors" --certainly 
make excellent majorettes for such a parade: 
Some are proposing what is called euthanasia; at present only a proposal 
for killing those who are a nuisance to themselves; but soon to be applied 
to those who are a nuisance to other people. 212 
Another reason why the "parade of horrors" argument cannot be 
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too lightly dismissed in this particular instance, it seems to me, is 
that the parade has taken place in our time and the order of pro-
cession has been headed by the killing of the "incurables" and the 
"useless": 
Even before the Nazis took open charge in Germany, a propaganda 
barrage was directed against the traditional compassionate nineteenth-
century attitudes toward the chronically ill, and for the adoption of a 
utilitarian, Hegelian point of view .... Lay opinion was not neglected in 
this campaign. Adults were propagandized by motion pictures, one of 
which, entitled 'I Accuse,' deals entirely with euthanasia. This film depicts 
the life history of a woman suffering from multiple sclerosis; in it her 
husband, a doctor, finally kills her to the accompaniment of soft piano 
music rendered by a sympathetic colleague in an adjoining room. Accept-
ance of this ideology was implanted even in the children. A widely used 
high school mathematics text . . . included problems stated in distorted 
terms of the cost of caring for and rehabilitating the chronically sick and 
crippled. One of the problems asked, for instance, how many new housing 
units could be built and how many marriage-allowance loans could be 
given to newly wedded couples for the amount of money it cost the state 
to care for 'the crippled, the criminal and the insane. . . . ' The beginnings 
at first were merely a subtle shift in emphasis in the basic attitude of the 
physicians. It started with the acceptance of the attitude, basic in the 
euthanasia movement, that there is such a thing as life not worthy to be 
lived. This attitude in its early stages concerned itself merely with the 
severely and chronically sick. Gradually the sphere of those to be included 
in this category was enlarged to encompass the socially unproductive, the 
ideologically unwanted, the racially unwanted, and finally all non-Germans. 
But it is important to realize that the infinitely small wedged-in lever from 
which this entire trend of mind received its impetus was the attitude toward 
the non-rehabilitatable sick.231 
The apparent innocuousness of Germany's "small beginnings" is per-
haps best shown by the fact that German Jews were at first excluded 
from the program. For it was originally conceived that "the blessing 
of euthanasia should be granted only to [true] Germans."214 
Relatively early in the German program, Pastor Braune, Chair-
man of the Executive Committee of the Domestic Welfare Council 
of the German Protestant Church, called for a halt to euthanasia 
measures 
. . . since they strike sharply at the moral foundations of the nation as 
a whole. The inviolability of human life is a pillar of any social order.215 
And the pastor raised the same question which euthanasia opponents 
ask today, as well they might, considering the disinclination of many 
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in the movement to stop at voluntary "mercy killings": Where do we, 
how do we, draw the line? The good pastor asked: 
How far is the destruction of socially unfit to go? The mass methods 
used so far have quite evidently taken in many people who are to a con-
siderable degree of sound mind. . . . Is it intend~d to strike only at the 
utterly hopeless cases-the idiots and imbeciles? The instruction sheet, as 
already mentioned, also lists senile diseases. The latest decree by the same 
authorities requires that children with serious congenital disease and mal-
formation of every kind be registered, to be collected and processed in 
special institutions. This necessarily gives rise to grave apprehensions. 
Will a line be drawn at the tubercular? In the case of persons in custody 
by court order euthanasia measures have evidently already been initiated. 
Are other abnormal or antisocial persons likewise to be included? Where 
is the borderline? Who is abnormal, antisocial, hopelessly sick?216 
Williams makes no attempt to distinguish or minimize the Nazi 
German experience. Apparently he does not consider it worthy of 
mention in a euthanasia discussion. There are, however, a couple of 
obvious arguments by which the Nazi experience can be minimized. 
One goes something like this: It is silly to worry about the pros-
pects of a dictatorship utilizing euthanasia 
. . . as a pretext for putting inconvenient citizens out of the way. 
Dictatorships have no occasion for such subterfuges. The firing squad is 
less bother. 217 
One reason why this counter argument is not too reassuring, how-
ever, if again I may be permitted to be so unkind as to meet specu-
lation with a concrete example to the contrary, is that Nazi Germany 
had considerable occasion to use just such a subterfuge. 
Thus, Dr. Leo Alexander observes: 
It is rather significant that the German people were considered by their 
Nazi leaders more ready to accept the exterminations of the sick than those 
for political reasons. It was for that reason that the first exterminations of 
the latter group were carried out under the guise of sickness. So-called 
'psychiatric experts' were dispatched to survey the inmates of camps with 
the specific order to pick out members of racial minorities and political 
offenders from occupied territories and to dispatch them to killing centers 
with specially made diagnoses such as that of 'inveterate German hater' 
applied to a number of prisoners who had been active in the Czech under-
ground. 
A large number of those marked for death for political or racial reasons 
were made available for 'medical experiments involving the use of involun-
tary human subjects. '218 
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The "hunting season" in Germany officially opened when Hitler 
signed, on his own letterhead, a secret order dated September 1, 
1939, which read: 
Reichsleiter Bouhler and Dr. Brandt, M.D., are charged with the respon-
sibility of enlarging the authority of certain physicians, to be designated 
by name, in such a manner that persons who, according to human judg-
ment, are incurable can, upon a more careful diagnosis of their condition 
of sickness, be accorded a mercy death.219 
Physicians asked to participate in the program were told that the 
secrecy of the order was designed to prevent patients from becoming 
"too agitated" and that it was in keeping with the policy of not pub-
licizing home front measures in time of war.220 
About the same time that aged patients in some hospitals were 
being given the "mercy" treatment,221 the Gestapo was also "sys-
tematically putting to death the mentally deficient population of the 
Reich. 222 
The courageous and successful refusal by a Protestant pastor to 
deliver up certain cases from his asylum223 well demonstrates that 
even the most totalitarian governments are not always indifferent to 
the feeling of the people, that they do not always feel free to resort 
to the firing squad. Indeed, vigorous protests by other ecclesiastical 
personalities and some physicians, numerous requests of various pub-
lic prosecutors for investigation of the circumstances surrounding 
the mysterious passing away of relatives, and a generally aroused 
public opinion finally caused Hitler to yield, if only temporarily, and 
in August of 1941 he verbally ordered the discontinuance of the 
adult euthanasia program. Special gas chambers in Hadamar and 
other institutions were dismantled and shipped to the East for much 
more extensive use of Polish Jews.224 
Perhaps it should be noted, too, that even dictatorships fall prey 
to the inertia of big government: 
It is . . . interesting that there was so much talk against euthanasia in 
certain areas of Germany, particularly in the region of Wiesbaden, that 
Hitler in 1943 asked Rimmler to stop it. But, it had gained so much 
impetus by 1943 and was such an easy way in crowded concentration 
camps to get rid of undesirables and make room for newcomers that it 
could not be stopped. The wind had become a whirlwind.225 
Another obvious argument is that it just can't happen here. I hope 
not. I think not. 
But then, neither did I think that tens of thousands of perfectly 
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loyal native-born Americans would be herded into prison camps 
without proffer of charges and held there for many months, even 
years, because they were of "Japanese blood"226 and, although the 
general who required these measures emitted considerable ignorance 
and bigotry,227 his so-called military judgment would be largely sus-
tained by the highest court of the land. The Japanese American ex-
perience of World War II undoubtedly fell somewhat short of first-
class Nazi tactics, but we were getting warm. I venture to say it 
would not be too difficult to find American citizens of Japanese de-
scent who would maintain we were getting very warm indeed. 
In this regard, some of Justice Jackson's observations in his Kore-
matsu dissene28 seem quite pertinent: 
All who observe the work of courts are familiar with what Judge 
Cardozo described as 'the tendency of a principle to expand itself to the 
limit of its logic.' [Nature of the Judicial Process, p. 51.] A military com-
mander may overstep the bounds of constitutionality, ·and it is an incident. 
But if we review and approve, that passing incident becomes the doctrine 
of the Constitution. There it has a generative power of its own, and all 
that it creates will be in its own image. Nothing better illustrates this danger 
than does the Court's opinion in this case. 
Jt argues that we are bound to uphold the conviction of Korematsu 
because we upheld one in Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 
when we sustained these orders in so far as they applied a curfew require-
ment to a citizen of Japanese ancestry. I think we should learn something 
from that experience. 
In that case we were urged to consider only the curfew feature, that 
being all that technically was involved, because it was the only count 
necessary to sustain Hirabayashi's conviction and sentence. We yielded, 
and the Chief Justice guarded the opinion as carefully as language will do . 
. . . However, in spite of our limiting words we did validate a discrimination 
on the. basis of ancestry for mild and temporary deprivation of liberty. 
Now the principle of racial discrimination is pushed from support of mild 
measures to very harsh ones, and from temporary deprivations to in-
determinate ones. And the precedent which it is said requires us to do so is 
Hirabayashi. The Court is now saying that in Hirabaypshi we did decide 
the very things we there said we were not deciding. Because we said that 
these citizens could be made to stay in their homes during the hours of 
dark, it is said we must require them to leave home entirely; and if that, 
we are told they may also be taken into custody for deportation; and if 
that, it is argued they may also be held for some undetermined time in 
detention camps. How far the principle of this case would be extended 
before plausible reasons would play out, I do not know.229 
It can't happen here. Well, maybe it cannot, but no small part of 
our Constitution and no small number of our Supreme Court opin-
ions stem from the fear that it can happen here unless we darn well 
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make sure that it does not by adamantly holding the line, by swiftly 
snuffing out what are or might be small beginnings of what we do 
not want to happen here. To flick off, as Professor Williams does, the 
fears about legalized euthanasia as so much nonsense, as a chimerical 
"parade of horrors," is to sweep away much of the ground on which 
all our civil liberties rest. 
Boyd,230 the landmark search and seizure case which paved the 
way for the federal rule of exclusion,231 a doctrine which now pre-
vails in over twenty state courts as well,232 set the mood of our day 
in treating those accused of crime: 
It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and least repulsive 
form; but illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing 
in that way, namely, by silent approaches and slight deviations from legal 
modes of procedure. . . . It is the duty of courts to be watchful for the 
constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments 
thereon. Their motto should be obsta principiis . ... 233 
Recent years have seen the Supreme Court sharply divided on 
search and seizure questions. The differences, however, have been 
over application, not over the Boyd-Weeks "wedge principle"; not 
over the view, as the great Learned Hand, hardly the frightened spin-
ster type, put it in an oft-quoted phrase, 
. . . that what seems fair enough against a squalid huckster of bad 
liquor may take on a very different face, if used by a government deter-
mined to suppress political opposition under the guise of sedition.234 
And when the dissenters have felt compelled to reiterate the reasons 
for the principle, lest its force be diminished by the failure to apply 
it in the particular case, and they have groped for the most powerful 
arguments in its behalf, where have they turned, what have they 
done? Why, they have employed the very arguments Glanville Wil-
liams dismisses so contemptuously. They have cited the Nazi experi-
ence. They have talked of the police state, the Knock at the Door, 
the suppression of political opposition under the guise of sedition. 
They have trotted out, if you will, the "parade of horrors."235 
The lengths to which the Court will go in applying the "wedge 
principle" in the First Amendment area is well demonstrated by in-
stances where those who have labeled Jews "slimy scum" and likened 
them to "bedbugs" and "snakes"236 or who have denounced them "as 
all the garbage that . . . should have been burnt in the incinera-
tors"237 have been sheltered by the Court so that freedom of speech 
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and religion would not be impaired. Perhaps the supreme example 
is the Barneue case. 238 
There, in striking down the compulsory flag salute and pledge, 
Justice Jackson took the position that "those who begin coercive 
elimination of dissent soon find themselves exterminating dissenters. 
Compulsory unification of opinion achieves only the unanimity of 
the graveyard."239 "The First Amendment," he pointed out, "was 
designed to avoid these ends by avoiding these beginnings."240 Jus-
tices Black and Douglas kept in step in their concurring opinion by 
advancing the view that "the ceremonial, when enforced against con-
scientious objectors ... is a handy implement for disguised religious 
persecution."241 
What were these pernicious "beginnings" again? What was this 
danger-laden ceremonial again? Why, requiring public school pupils, 
"to participate in the salute honoring the Nation represented by the 
Flag."242 Talk about "parades of horror"! This one is an extrava-
ganza against which anything euthanasia opponents can muster is 
drab and shabby by comparison. After all, whatever else Williams 
and his allies make "mercy killings" out to be, these beginnings are 
not "patriotic ceremonies." 
The point need not be labored. If the prospects of the police state, 
the knock on Everyman's door, and widespread political persecution 
are legitimate considerations when we enter "opium smoking 
dens,"243 when we deal with "not very nice people" and "sordid little 
cases"244 then why should the prospects of the police state and the 
systematic extermination of certain political or racial minorities be 
taken any less seriously when we enter the sickroom or the mental 
institution, when we deal with not very healthy or not very useful 
people, when we discuss "euthanasia" under whatever trade name? 
If freeing some rapist or murderer is not too great a price to pay 
for the "sanctity of the home," then why is allowing some cancer 
victim to suffer a little longer too great a price to pay for the "sanc-
tity of life"? If the sheltering of purveyors of "hateful and hate-stir-
ring attacks on races and faiths"245 may be justified in the name of 
a transcendent principle, then why may not postponing the death of 
the suffering "incurable" be similarly justified? 
A Final Reftection 
There have been and there will continue to be compelling circum-
stances when a doctor or relative or friend will violate The Law On 
The Books and, more often than not, receive protection from The 
Law In Action. But this is not to deny that there are other occasions 
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when The Law On The Books operates to stay the hand of all con-
cerned, among them situations where the patient is in fact ( 1 ) pres-
ently incurable, ( 2) beyond the aid of any respite which may come 
along in his life expectancy, suffering ( 3 ) intolerable and ( 4) un-
mitigable pain and of a ( 5) fixed and ( 6) rational desire to die. That 
any euthanasia program may only be the opening wedge for far more 
objectionable practices, and that even within the bounds of a "volun-
tary" plan such as Williams' the incidence of mistake or abuse is 
likely to be substantial, are not much solace to one in the above 
plight. 
It may be conceded that in a narrow sense it is an "evil" for such 
a patient to have to continue to suffer-if only for a little while. But 
in a narrow sense, long-term sentences and capital punishment are 
"evils," too.246 If we can justify the infliction of imprisonment and 
death by the state "on the ground of the social interests to be pro-
tected"247 then surely we can similarly justify the postponement of 
death by the state. The objection that the individual is thereby 
treated not as an "end" in himself but only as a "means" to further 
the common good was, I think, aptly disposed of by Holmes long ago. 
"If a man lives in society, he is likely to find himself so tteated."248 
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150. L. A. Tollemache-and not since has there been a more persuasive enthusiast-
made an eloquent plea for voluntary euthanasia, The New Cure for Incurables, Fort-
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177. Rex v. Simpson, 11 Crim. App. R. 218, 84 L.J.K.B. 1893 (1915), dealt with a young 
soldier on leave, who, while watching his severely ill child and waiting for his un-
faithful wife to return home, cut the child's throat with a razor. His statement was 
as follows: "The reason why I done it was I could not see it suffer any more than 
what it really had done. She was not looking after the child, and it was lying there 
from morning to night, and no one to look after it, and I could not see it suffer any 
longer and have to go away and leave it." Simpson was convicted of murder and his 
application for leave to appeal dismissed. The trial judge was held to have properly 
directed the jury that they were not at liberty to find a verdict of manslaughter, 
though the prisoner killed the child "with the best and kindest motive.'' 
178. Told to undergo a serious operation, and worried about the fate of her 31 year old 
imbecile son if she were to succumb, 62 year old Mrs. May Brownhill took his life 
by giving him about 100 aspirins and then placing a gas tube in his mouth. The 
Times, London, Oct. 2, 1934, p. 11, col. 2; N.Y. Times, Dec. 2, 1934, p. 25, col. 1, 
Dec. 4, 1934, p. 15, col. 3. Her family doctor testified that the boy's life had been 
"a veritable living death" The Times, London, Dec. 3, 1934, p. 11, col. 4. She was 
sentenced to death, with a strong recommendation for mercy, The Times, London, 
Dec. 3, 1934, p. 11, col. 4; N.Y. Times, Dec. 2, 1934, p. 25, col. 1, but she was 
reprieved two days later, The Times, London, Dec. 4, 1934, p. 14, col. 2; and par-
doned and set free three months later, The Times, London, Mar. 4, 1935, p. 11, 
col. 3; Mother May's Holiday, Time, Mar. 11, 1935, p. 21. According to the N.Y. 
Times, Mar. 3, 1935, p. 3, col. 2, the Home Office acted "in response to nationwide 
sentiment." The Chicago Tribune report of the case is reprinted in Harno, Criminal 
Law and Procedure. 1957, p. 36, n. 2. Fourth edition. 
Incidentally, Mrs. Brownhill's operation was quite successful. The Times, London, 
Dec. 3, 1934, p. 11, col. 4. 
179. Gordon Long gassed his deformed and imbecile seven year old daughter to death, 
stating he loved her "more so than if she had been normal." Goodbye. Time, Dec. 2, 
1946, p. 32. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to death, but within a week the 
sentence was commuted to life imprisonment. The Times, London, Nov. 23, 1946, 
p. 2, col. 7; Nov. 29, 1946, p. 7, col. 2; N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1946, p. 7, col. 2. 
180. For 17 years, Louis Greenfield, a prosperous Bronx milliner, had washed, dressed 
and fed his son, an "incurable imbecile" with the mentality of a two year old who 
spoke in a mumble understandable only by his mother. N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1939, 
p. 3, col. 1, May 12, 1939, p. 1, col. 6. Finally, after considering killing him for 
several years, Greenfield sent his wife out of the house, lest she interfere with his 
plans, and chloroformed his son to death. He is reported to have told members of 
the emergency squad: "Don't revive him, he's better off dead," N.Y. Times, May 9, 
1939, p. 48, col. 1. See also Better Off Dead, Time, Jan. 23, 1939, p. 24. 
At the trial Greenfield testified that he killed his son because "I loved him, it was 
the will of God." He insisted that he was directed by an "unseen hand" and by an 
"unknown voice," N.Y. Times, May 11, 1939, p. 10, col. 2 and was acquitted of first 
degree manslaughter, N.Y. Times, May 12, 1939, p. 1, col. 6. Some psychiatrists 
were reported to have condemned Greenfield as "a murderer who had simply grown 
tired of caring for his imbecile son." Better Off Dead, supra. 
181. This case is quite similar to the Greenfield case which preceded it by several months. 
In fact, Louis Repouille said he had read the newspaper accounts of the Greenfield 
case and: "It made me think about doing the same thing to my boy. I think Mr. 
Greenfield was justified. They didn't punish him for it. But I am not looking for 
sympathy," N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 1939, p. 21, col. 2. 
Repouille was an elevator operator who had spent his life's earnings trying to 
cure his "incurably imbecile" 13 year old son who had been blind for five years and 
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bedridden since infancy. Repouille is reported to have put it this way: "He was just 
like dead all the time. . . . He couldn't walk, he couldn't talk, he couldn't do any-
thing." N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1939, p. 25, col. 7. He testified at the trial that the 
idea of putting his son out of his misery "came to me thousands of times," N.Y. 
Times, Dec. 6, 1941, p. 34, col. 2. Finally, one day when his wife stepped out of the 
house for a while, he chloroformed his son to death. N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1939, p. 
25, col. 7. 
Repouille kept a number of canaries and lovebirds in his home. When a neighbor 
found the Repouille boy with a chloroform-soaked rag over his face, he removed 
the rag and was about to throw it on the floor when Repouille is reported to have 
said: "Don't, can't you see I have some birds here." Ibid. 
Repouille was found guilty of manslaughter in the second degree, N.Y. Times, Dec. 
10, 1941, p. 27, col. 7, and freed on a suspended sentence of 5-10 years. N.Y. Times, 
Dec. 25, 1941, p. 44, col. 1. 
Subsequently, Repouille's petition for naturalization was dismissed on the ground 
that he had not possessed "good moral character" within the five years preceding 
the filing of the petition. In an opinion which makes Repouille the "mercy killing" 
perhaps best known to lawyers today, Judge Learned Hand said in part: 
"It is reasonably clear that the jury which tried Repouille did not feel any moral 
repulsion at his crime. Although it was inescapably murder in the first degree, not 
only did they bring in a verdict that was flatly in the face of the facts and utterly 
absurd-for manslaughter in the second degree presupposes that the killing has not 
been deliberate-but they coupled even that with a recommendation which showed 
that in substance they wished to exculpate the offender. Moreover, it is also plain, 
from the sentence which he imposed, that the judge could not have seriously dis-
agreed with their recommendation. 
* * • 
"Left at large as we are, without means of verifying our conclusion, and without 
authority to substitute our individual beliefs, the outcome must needs be tentative; 
and not much is gained by discussion. We can say no more than that, ... we feel 
reasonably secure in holding that only a minority of virtuous persons would deem 
the practice morally justifiable, while it remains in private hands, even when the 
provocation is as overwhelming as it was in this instance." Repouille v. United 
States, 165 F. 2d 152, 153 (2d Cir. 1947). 
182. John F. Noxon, a 46 year old well-to-do lawyer, was charged with electrocuting 
his six month old mongoloid son by wrapping a frayed electric cord about him and 
placing him-in wet diapers-on a silver serving tray to form contact. Noxon 
claimed it was all an accident. N.Y. Times, Sept. 28, 1943, p. 27, col. 2; Sept. 29, 
1943, p. 23, col. 7; Oct. 29, 1943, p. 21, col. 7; Jan. 14, 1944, p. 21, col. 3; July 7, 
1944, p. 30, col. 2; July 8, 1944, p. 24, col. 1. After a mistrial because a juror 
became ill, N.Y. Times. Mar. 10, 1944, Noxon was convicted of first degree murder, 
N.Y. Times, July 7, 1944, p. 30, col. 2. His death sentence was commuted to life, 
but in granting the clemency, Gov. M. J. Tobin of Massachusetts did not explain 
the "extenuating circumstances" other than to caution that a "mercy-killing, so-
called," could not be considered an extenuating circumstance and was not a factor 
in his decision. N.Y. Times, Aug. 8, 1946, p. 42, col. 4. To make parole possible, 
Noxon's sentence was further commuted to six years to life with the proviso that 
he would live under parole supervision for life upon release from prison. N.Y. 
Times, Dec. 30, 1948, p. 13, col. 5. Shortly thereafter, Noxon was paroled, N.Y. 
Times, Jan. 4, 1949, p. 16, col 3; Jan. 8, 1949, p. 30 col. 4. He was disbarred the 
following year. N.Y. Times, May 30, 1950, p. 2, col. 7. 
183. Virginia Braunsdorf was a spastic-crippled 29 year old "helpless parody of woman-
hood," who could not hold her head upright and who talked in gobbling sounds 
which only her father could understand. At one time, to keep her home and well 
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attended, her father, Eugene, a symphony musician, had held down four jobs 
simultaneously, but he finally resigned himself to leaving her at a private sani-
tarium. Worried about his health and the fate of his daughter if he should die, 
Braunsdorf took her from the sanitarium on a pretense, stopped his car, put a 
pillow behind her head, and shot her dead. He then attempted suicide. He was 
found not guilty by reason of temporary insanity. Murder or Mercy? Time, June 5, 
1950, p. 20; N.Y. Times, May 23, 1950, p. 25, col. 4. 
The prosecution argued that the girl was "human" and "had a right to live" and 
accused Braundorf of slaying her because she was a "burden on his pocketbook." 
N.Y. Times, May 23, 1950, p. 25, col. 4. The prosecution failed to explain, how-
ever, why a person furthering his own financial interests by killing his daughter 
would then fire two shots into his own chest, and, on reviving, shoot himself twice 
more. 
184. In Wolbarst, 1939, supra 74, Dr. Dr. Wolbarst describes the Brownhill case as an 
act of mercy, based on pure mother-love" for which, thanks to the growth of the 
euthanasia movement in England, "it is doubtful that this poor woman even would 
be put on trial at the present day." 
In Taking Life Legally, Magazine Digest, 1947, Louis Greenfield's testimony that 
what he did "was against the law of man, but not against the law of God," is cited 
with apparent approval. The article continues: 
"The acquittal of Mr. Greenfield is indicative of a growing attitude towards 
euthanasia, or 'mercy killing,' as the popular press phrases it. Years ago, a similar 
act would have drawn the death sentence; today, the mercy killer can usually count 
on the sympathy and understanding of the court-and his freedom." 
185. Williams, p. 319, and n. 9. For a discussion of the Simpson case, see supra 177. 
186. Williams, p. 328. For a discussion of the Sander case see supra 172. The other case 
as Williams notes, p. 328. n. 5, is the same one described by Lord Ponsonby in the 
1936 House of Lords debate. See text at 153, supra. 
187. Williams, p. 328. Williams does not cite to any particular page of the thirty-nine 
page Silving article, supra 7, but in context he appears to allude to pp. 353-4 of the 
article. 
188. In addition to the Sander case, the cases Williams makes apparent reference to are 
the Paight case, see supra 173-6 and accompanying text; the Braunsdorf case, see 
supra 183; and the Mohr case, see supra 17. Only in the Mohr case was there ap-
parently euthanasia by request. 
189. According to the Royal Warrant, the Commission was appointed in May, 1949, "to 
consider and report whether liability under the criminal law in Great Britain to 
suffer capital punishment for murder should be limited or modified,'' but was pre-
cluded from considering whether capital punishment should be abolished. Royal 
Commission On Capital Punishment, Report, Cmd. No. 8932, p. iii, 1953 (called 
henceforth the Royal Commission Report). For an account of the circumstances 
which led to the appointment of the Commission, see Prevezer, the English Homi-
cide Act: A New Attempt to Revise the Law of Murder, Colum. L. Rev., 57: 624, 
629, 1957. 
190. "It was agreed by almost all witnesses" that it would "often prove extremely difficult 
to distinguish killings where the motive was merciful from those where it was not." 
Royal Commission Report, 1953, para. 179. Thus the Commission "reluctantly" con-
cluded that "it would not be possible to frame and apply a definition which would 
satisfactorily cover these cases. ld. para. 180. 
191. Royal Commission Report, 1953, para. 180. 
192. Minutes of Evidence, Dec. 1. 1949, pp. 219-20. Mr. Hughes, however, would try the 
apparent "mercy killer" for murder rather than for manslaughter "because the evi-
dence should be considered not in camera but in open court, when it may turn out 
that it was not manslaughter." Id. para. 2825. "[T]he onus should rest upon the 
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person so charged to prove that it was not a malicious, but a merciful killing." Jd. 
para. 2826. 
193. Minutes of Evidence, Jan. 5, 1950, para. 3120. The Lord Chief Justice did not refer 
to the case by name, but his reference to Brownhill is unmistakable. For an account 
of this case, see supra 178. 
194. Minutes of Evidence, para. 3120, Jan. 5, 1950. 
195. ld. para. 3315. 
196. Ibid. 
197. Williams, p. 348. 
198. ld. p. 347. 
199. Of all first admissions to New York State Civil Hospitals for mental disorders in 
1950, some 5,818 patients-or more than one third-were classified as cerebral 
arteriosclerosis or senile cases. There were 3,379 psychoses with cerebral arterio-
sclerosis and 2,439 senile psychoses. In the case of cerebral arteriosclerosis this rep-
resented a 600% numerical increase and a 300% increase in the proportion of total 
first admissions since 1920. The senile psychoses constituted almost a 400% numeri-
cal increase and a 155% increase in the proportion of total first admissions since 
1920. Malzberg. A Statistical Review of Mental Disorders in Later Life. In Kaplan 
(Ed.) Mental Disorders in Later Life, 195·6, p. 13. Dr. George S. Stevenson classes 
both psychoses together as "mental illness of aging": "As a rule these patients have 
very limited prospect of recovery. In fact, they die on the average within fifteen 
months after admission to a mental hospital." Stevenson. Mental Health Planning For 
Social Action, 1956, p. 41. 
200. U.S. Dept. of Health, Education and Welfare, Patients in Mental Institutions 1955. 
Part II, Public Hospital for the Mentally Ill. p. 21. Some 13,972 were cerebral 
arteriosclerosis cases; 9,589 had senile brain diseases. 
201. See supra 143. 
202. Banks. supra 143, p. 305. 
203. "Mental diseases are said to be responsible for as much time lost in hospitals as all 
other diseases combined." Boudreau,. Mental Health: The New Public Frontier. Ann. 
A mer. A cad. Pol. & Soc. Sci., 286:1, 1953. As of about ten years ago, there were 
"over 900,00 patients under the care and supervision of mental hospitals." Felix and 
Kramer. Extent of the Problem of Mental Disorders. Id. pp. 5, 10. Taking only the 
figures of persons sufficiently ill to warrant admission into a hospital for long-term 
care of psychiatric disorders, "at the end of 19'50 there were 577,000 patients ... in 
all long-term mental hospitals." ld. p. 9. This figure represents 3.8 per 1,000 popula-
tion, and a "fourfold increase in number of patients and a twofold increase in ratio 
of patients to general population since 1903." Ibid. 
"During 1950, the state, county, and city mental hospitals spent $390,000,000 for 
care and maintenance of their patients. Id. p. 13. 
204. Williams, pp. 349-50. 
205. In Turano, Murder by Request Amer. Mercury, 3-6:423, 1935, the author goes con-
siderably beyond the title of his paper. He scores the "barbarous social policy" which 
nurtures "infant monstrosities and hopelessly injured children for whom permanent 
suffering is the sole joy of living" and "old men and women awaiting slow extinction 
from the accumulated ailments of senility," id. p. 424, and notes in his discussion of 
"permissive statutes" that "when the sufferer is not mentally competent, the decision 
could be left to near relatives," id. p. 428. 
In Should They Live? Amer. Scholar, 7:454, 1938, Dr. W. G. Lennox refers to the 
congenital idols, the incurably sick, the mentally ill and the aged as "that portion of 
our population which is a heavy and permanent liability," id. p. 457, and agrees with 
others that "there is somewhere a biological limit to altruism, even for- man," id. p. 
458. Dr. Lennox would presently eliminate "only the idiots and monsters, the crimi-
nal permanently insane and the suffering incurables who themselves wish for death," 
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id. p. 464. W. W. Gregg similarly advocates euthanasia for all "criminally or hope-
lessly insane," The Right to Kill, No. Amer. Rev., 237:239, 247, 1934 and con-
cludes, id. p. 249: 
"With the coming of a more rational social order ... it is possible to foresee the 
emergence of a socialized purpose to eliminate such human life as shows itself con-
spicuously either inhuman, or unhuman, or unable to function happily; in order 
thereby to help bring about a safer and fuller living for that normal humanity 
which holds the hope of the future. 
W. A. Shumaker, in Those Unfit to Live, L.N. 29:165, 166-7, 1925, comments: 
"Could we but devise an acceptable formula, ten thousand idiots annually put to 
death by state boards of health would mean no more to us than ten thousand pedes-
trians annually put to death by automobilists do now. 
• • • 
"It is impossible to give a common sense reason why an absolute idiot should be 
permitted to live. His life is of no value to him or to anyone else, and to maintain 
its existence absorbs a considerable part of the life of a normal being. Of course one 
shrinks at the thought of putting him to death. But why is it that we shrink? And 
why, though we shrink from such an act, do we find it possible to excuse him who 
does it? 
• • • 
"Is the balance swinging too far toward over-consideration not only for the idiot 
but for the moron and the lunatic and too little consideration for the normality on 
which civilization must rest?" In 1935, Dr. Alexis Carrel, the Rockefeller Institute's 
famed Nobel Prize winner, took the position that "not only incurables but kidnapers, 
murderers, habitual criminals of all kinds, as well as the hopelessly insane, should 
be quietly and painlessly disposed of." Newsweek, Nov. 16, 1935, p. 40; Time, Nov. 
18, 1935, p. 53; Pro and Con: Right and Wrong of Mercy Killing, The Digest, 
1:22, 1937. 
Another debate on mercy killing, supra 92, p. 94, similarly embraced involuntary 
situations. The "question presented" was: 
"Should physicians have the legal privilege of putting painlessly out of their suffer-
ings unadjustably defective infants, patients suffering from painful and incurable 
illness and the hopelessly insane and feeble-minded provided, of course, that maxi-
mum legal and professional safeguards against abuse are set up, including the consent 
of the patient whe11 rational and adult?'; (Emphasis added.) -
The proponents of euthanasia made the pitch for voluntray euthanasia, then shifted 
(p. 95): 
"Euthanasia would also do away with our present savage insistence that some of 
us must live on incurably insane or degraded by the helplessness of congenital 
imbecility." 
For the results of a 1937 national poll on the question which covered the problem 
of "infants born permanently deformed or mentally handicapped" as well as "persons 
incurably and painfully ill." See infra 207 and accompanying text. 
206. Dr. Foster Kennedy believes euthanasia of congenital idiots has two major advan-
tages over voluntary euthanasia ( 1) error in diagnosis and possibility of betterment 
by unforeseen discoveries are greatly reduced; (2) there is not mind enough to hold 
any dream or hope which is likely to be crushed by the forthright statement that one 
is doomed, a necessary communication under a voluntary euthanasia program. Ken-
nedy's views are contained in Euthanasia: To Be Or Not To Be, supra 42, 1939, re-
printed with the notation that his views remain unchanged, supra 42, 1950; The 
Problem of Social Control of the Congential Defective. A mer. J. Psychiat., 99:13, 
1942. See also text at 72-4, supra. 
Dr. Wolbarst also indicates that error in diagnosis and possibilities of a cure are 
reduced in the case of insane or defective people. See text at 74-6, supra. 
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207. The Fortune Quarterly Survey: IX. Fortune, July 1937, pp. 96, 106. Actually, a 
slight majority of those who took a position on the defective infants favored eutha-
nasia under certain circumstances since 45% approved under certain circumstances, 
40.5% were unconditionally opposed, and 14.5% were undecided. In the case of the 
incurably ill, only 37.3% were in favor of euthanasia under any set of safeguards, 
47.5% were flatly opposed, and 15.2% took no position. 
Every major poll taken in the United States on the question has shown popular 
opposition to voluntary euthanasia. In 1937 and 1939 the American Institute of 
Public Opinion polls found 46% in favor, 54% opposed. A 1947 poll by the same 
group found only 37% in favor, 54% opposed and 9% of no opinion. For a discus-
sion of these and other polls by various newspapers and a breakdown of the public 
attitude on the question in terms of age, sex, economic and educational levels see 
Note, Judicial Determination of Moral Conduct In Citizenship Hearings, U. of Chi. 
L. Rev., 16:138, 141-2 and n. 11, 1948. 
As Williams notes, however, p. 332, a 1939 British Institute of Public Opinion poll 
found 68% of the British in favor of some form of legal euthanasia. 
208. The Fortune Quarterly Survey, supra 207. 
209. Mitscherlich and Mielke. Doctors of Infamy, 1949, P. 114. The Reich Committee for 
Research on Hereditary Diseases and Constitutional Susceptibility to Severe Diseases 
originally dealt only with child patients up to the age of three, but the age limit was 
later raised to eight, twelve, and apparently even sixteen or seventeen years. Id p. 116. 
210. II Kings, VI, 32, quoted and applied in Sperry. The Case Against Mercy Killing. 
Amer. Mercury, 70:271, 276, 1950. 
211. Williams, p. 315. At this point, Williams is quoting from Sullivan, Catholic Teaching 
on the Morality of Euthanasia, 1949, pp. 54-5. This thorough exposition of the 
Catholic Church's position on euthanasia was originally published by the Catholic 
University of America Press, than republished by the Newman Press as The Morality 
'Of Mercy Killing, 1950. 
212. Supra 26. 
213. Alexander. Medical Science Under Dictatorship. N. Engl. J. Med., 241:39, 44, 40, 
1949 (emphasis added). To the same effect is Ivy. Nap War Crimes of a Medical 
Nature. lAMA, 139:131, 132, 1949, concluding that the practice of euthanasia was a 
factor which led to "mass killing of the aged, the chronically ill, 'useless eaters' and 
the politically undesirable," and Ivy. Nazi War Crimes of a Medical Nature, Federa-
tion Bull.; 33:133, 142, 1947, noting that one of the arguments the Nazis employed 
to condone their criminal medical experiments was that "if it is right to take the life 
of useless and incurable persons which as they point out has been suggested in Eng-
land and the United States then it is right to take the lives of persons who are 
destined to die for political reasons." 
Doctors Leo Alexander and A. C. Ivy were both expert medical advisors to the 
prosecution at the Nuremberg Trials. 
See also the Nov. 25, 1940 entry to Shirer, Berlin Diary, 1941, pp. 454, 458-9: 
"I have at last got to the bottom of these 'mercy killings.' It's an evil tale. The 
Gestapo, with the knowledge and approval of the German government is systemically 
putting to death the mentally deficient population of the Reich. 
"X, a German, told me yesterday that relatives are rushing to get their kin out of 
private asylums and out of the clutches of the authorities. He says the Gestapo is 
doing to death persons who are merely suffering temporary derangement or just plain 
nervous breakdown. 
"What is still unclear to me is the motive for these murders. Germans themselves 
advance three: 
* * * 
"3. That they are simply the result of the extreme Nazis deciding to carry out 
their eugenic and sociological ideas. 
* * * 
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"The third motive seems most likely to me. For years a group of radical Nazi 
sociologists who were instrumental in putting through the Reich's sterilization laws 
have pressed for a national policy of eliminating the mentally unfit. They say they 
have disciples among many sociologists in other lands, and perhaps they have. 
Paragraph two of the form letter sent the relatives plainly bears the stamp of the 
sociological thinking: 'In view of the nature of his serious incurable ailment, his 
death, which saved him from a lifelong institutonal sojourn, is to be regarded merely 
as a release.'" (Reprinted in CF 10:40-58, 1971.) 
This contemporaneous report is supported by evidence uncovered at the Nurem-
berg Medical Trial. Thus, an August, 1940 form letter to the relatives of a deceased 
mental patient states in part: "Because of her grave mental illness life was a torment 
for the deceased. You must therefore look on her death as a release." This form 
letter is reproduced in Mitscherlich and Mielke, supra 209, p. 103. Dr. Alexander 
Mitscherlich and Mr. Fred Mielke attended the trial as delegates chosen by a group 
of German medical societies and universities. 
According to the testimony of the chief defendant at the Nuremberg Medical Trial. 
Karl Brandt, Reich Commissioner for Health and Sanitation and personal physician 
to Hitler, the Fuhrer had indicated in 1935 that if war came he would effectuate the 
policy of euthanasia since in the general upheaval of war the open resistance to be 
anticipated on the part of the church would not be the potent force it might other-
wise be. Supra 209, p. 91. 
Certain petitions to Hitler by parents of malformed children requesting authority 
for "mercy deaths" seem to have played a part in definitely making up his mind. 
Ibid. 
214. Defendant Viktor Brack, Chief Administrative Officer in Hitler's private chancellory, 
so testified at the Nuremberg Medical Trial, 1 Trials of War Criminals Before the 
Nuremberg Military Tribunal Under Control Council Law No. 10, 1950, pp. 877-80 
("The Medical Case"). 
215. Supra 209, p. 107. 
216. Ibid. According to testimony at the Nuremberg Medical Trial, although they were 
told that "only incurable patients, suffering severely, were involved," even the medical 
consultants to the program were "not quite clear on where the line was to be drawn." 
ld. p. 94. 
217. Supra 92, p. 96. 
218. Alexander, supra 213, p. 41. Dr. Alexander Mitscherlich and Mr. Fred Mielke simi-
larly note: 
"The granting of 'dying aid' in the case of incurable mental patients and mal-
formed or idiot children may be considered to be still within the legitimate sphere 
of medical discussion. But as the "winnowing process' continued, it moved more and 
more openly as purely political and ideological criteria for death, whether the sub-
jects were considered to be 'undesirable racial groups,' or whether they had merely 
become incapable of supporting themselves. The camouflage around these murderous 
intentions is revealed especially by proof that in the concentration camps prisoners 
were selected by the same medical consultants who were simultaneously sitting in 
judgment over the destiny of mental institution inmates." Supra 213, p. 41. 
219. This is the translation rendered in the judgment of Military Tribunal 1, 2 Trials of 
War Criminals Before The Nuremberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council 
Law No. 10, 196 (1950) ("The Medical Case"). A slightly different but substan-
tially identical translation appears in Mitscherlich and Mielke, supra 209, p. 92. 
The letter, Document 630-PS, Prosecution Exhibit 330, as written in the original 
German, may be found in Trial of Major War Criminals Before the International 
Military Tribunal, 2.6:169 ( 1947). For conflicting views on whether or not the order 
was back-dated, compare Mitscherlich and Mielke, supra with Koessler, Euthanasia. 




220. Supra 209, pp. 93-4. 
221. In the fall of 1940, Catholic priests at a large hospital near Urach "noticed that 
elderly people in the hospital were dying in increasing numbers, and dying on certain 
days." Straight. Germany Executes Her "Unfit," New Republic, 104:627, 1941. Such 
incidents led a German bishop to ask the Supreme Sacred Congregation whether it 
is right to kill those "who, although they have committed no crime deserving death, 
yet, because of mental or physical defects, are no longer able to benefit the nation, 
and are considered rather to burden the nation and to obstruct its energy and 
strength." Ibid. The answer was, of course, in the negative, ibid., but "it is doubtful 
if the mass of German Catholics, even if they learned of this statement from Rome, 
which is improbable, understood what it referred to. Only a minority in Germany 
knew of the 'mercy deaths.'" Shirer, supra 213, p. 459, n. 1. 
222. Shirer, supra 213, p. 454. 
223. "Late last summer, it seems Pastor von Bodelschwingh was asked to deliver up cer-
tain of his worst cases to the authorities. Apparently he got wind of what was in 
store for them. He refused. The authorities insisted. Pastor von Bodelschwingh 
hurried to Berlin to protest. 
"Pastor von Bodelschwingh returned to Bethel. The local Gauleiter ordered him to 
turn over some of his inmates. Again he refused. Berlin then ordered his arrest. This 
time the Gauleiter protested. The pastor was the most popular man in his province. 
To arrest him in the middle of war would stir up a whole world of unnecessary 
trouble. He himself declined to arrest the man. Let the Gestapo take the responsibil-
ity; he wouldn't. This was just before the night of September 18, [1940]. The bomb-
ing of the Bethel asylum followed. Now I understand why a few people wondered as 
to who dropped the bombs." Shirer, supra 213, pp. 454-5. 
224. Supra 209, pp. 113-4; Koessler, supra 219, p. 739. 
225. Ivy, 1947, supra 213, pp. 133, 134. 
226. As Justice Murphy pointed out in his dissenting opinion in Korematsu v. United 
States, 323 U.S. 214, 241-2 (1944): 
"No adequate reason is given for the failure to treat these Japanese Americans on 
an individual basis by holding investigations and hearings to separate the loyal from 
the disloyal, as was done in the case of persons of German and Italian ancestry. It 
is asserted merely that the loyalties of this group 'were unknown and time was of the 
essence.' Yet nearly four months elapsed after Pearl Harbor before the first exclusion 
order was issued; nearly eight months went by until the last order was issued; and 
the last of these 'subversive' persons was not actually removed until almost eleven 
months had elapsed. Leisure and deliberation seem to have been more of the essence 
than speed. And the fact that conditions were not such as to warrant a declaration 
of martial Jaw adds strength to the belief that the factors of time and military 
necessity were not as urgent as they have been represented to be. 
"Moreover, there was no adequate proof that the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
and the military and naval intelligence services did not have the espionage and 
sabotage situation well in hand during this long period. Nor is there any denial of 
the fact not one person of Japanese ancestry was accused or convicted of espionage 
or sabotage after Pearl Harbor while they were still free, a fact which is some evi-
dence of the loyalty of the vast majority of these individuals and of the effectiveness 
of the established methods of combatting these evils. It seems incredible that under 
these circumstances it would have been impossible to hold loyalty hearings for the 
mere 112,000 persons involved or at least for the 70,000 American citizens especially 
when a large part of this number represented children and elderly men and women." 
Justice Murphy then went on to note that shortly after the outbreak of World War 
II the British Government examined over 70,000 German arid Austrian aliens and 
in six months freed 64,000 from internment and from any special restrictions. 354 
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U.S. 242 n. 16. 
See generally Rostow, The Japanese American Cases-A Disaster. Yale L. J. 
54:489, 1945, a tale well calculated to keep you in anger and shame. 
227. See, e.g., General J. L. Dewitt's Final Recommendation to the Secretary of War, 
U.S. Army, Western Defense Command, Final Report, Japanese Evacuation From 
the West Coast, 1942. 1943, p. 32 (''The Japanese race is an enemy race and while 
many second and third generation Japanese born on United States soil, possessed of 
United States citizenship have become 'Americanized,' the racial strains are un-
diluted .... "), and his subsequent testimony, Hearings Before Subcommittee of 
House Committee on Naval Affairs on H.R. 30, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. 1943, pp. 
739-40. ("You needn't worry about the Italians at all except in certain cases. Also, 
the same for the Germans except in individual cases. But we must worry about the 
Japanese all the time until he is wiped off the map. Sabotage and espionage will 
make problems as long as he is allowed in this area-problems which I don't want 
to have to worry about.") After a careful study, Professor (now Dean) Rostow 
took this position: 
''The dominant factor in the development of this policy was not a military esti-
mate of a military problem, but familiar West Coast attitudes of race prejudice. The 
program of excluding all persons of Japanese ancestry from the coastal area was 
conceived and put through by the organized minority whose business it has been 
for forty-five years to increase and exploit racial tensions on the West Coast. The 
Native Sons and Daughters of the Gold West and their sympathizers, were lucky 
in their general, for General DeWitt amply proved himself to be one of them in 
opinion and values." Rostow, supra 226, p. 4%. 
228. See supra 226. 
229. 323 U.S. at 246-7. 
230. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886). 
231. See e.g., Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 283 (1914); Gouled v. United States, 255 
U.S. 298 (1921); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 45·1 (1948); United States v. 
Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951). 
232. See Anno. 50 Amer; L. Rev. 2d 531, 536, 556-60 (1956). 
233. 116 U.S. 616, 635. The search and seizure cases contain about as good an articula-
tion of the "wedge principle" as one can find anywhere, except, perhaps if one 
turns to the recent Covert and Krueger cases, where Mr. Justice Black quotes the 
Boyd statement with approval and applies it with vigor: 
"It is urged that the expansion of military jurisdiction over civilians claimed here 
is only slight, and that the practical necessity .for it is very great. The attitude ap-
pears to be that a slight encroachment on the Bill of Rights and other safeguards in 
the Constitution need cause little concern. But to hold that these wives could be 
tried by the Military would be a tempting precedent. Slight encroachments create 
new boundaries from which legions of power can seek new territory to capture." 
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 39-.W (19'57). 
234. United States v. Kirschenblatt, 16, F.2d 202, 203 (2nd Cir. 1926). 
235. Thus, in Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949), it was Jackson the Chief 
Counsel of the United States at the Nuremberg Trials as well as Jackson the Su-
preme Court Justice who warned (338 U.S. at 180-1): 
"Among deprivations of rights, none is so effective in cowing a population, crush-
ing the spirit of the individual and putting terror in every heart. Uncontrolled search 
and seizure is one of the first and most effective weapons in the arsenal of every 
arbitrary government. And one need only briefly to have dwelt and worked among a 
people possessed of many admirable qualities but deprived of these rights to know 
that the human personality deteriorates and dignity and self-reliance disappear where 
homes, persons, and possessions are subject at any hour to unheralded search and 
seizure by the police." 
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In United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 82 (1950), Justice Frankfurter cau-
tioned: 
"By the Bill of Rights the founders of this country subordinated police action to 
legal restraints, not in order to convenience the guilty but to protect the innocent. 
Nor did they provide that only the innocent may appeal to these safeguards. They 
know too well that the successful prosecution of the guilty does not require jeopardy 
to the innocent. The knock at the door under the guise of a warrant of arrest for a 
venial or spurious offense was not unknown to them .... We have had grim re-
minders in our day of their experience. Arrest under a warrant for a minor or a 
trumped-up charge has been familiar practice in the past, is a commonplace in the 
police state of today, and too well known in this country .... The progress is too 
easy from police action unscrutinized by judicial authorization to the police state." 
In Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947), four Justices dissented in there sepa-
rate opinions. The first dissent asked (331 U.S. at 163): 
"How can there be freedom of thought or freedom of speech or freedom of 
religion, if the police can, without warrant, search your house and mine from garret 
to cellar merely because they are executing a warrant of arrest? How can men feel 
free if all their papers may be searched, as an incident to the arrest of someone in 
the house, on the chance that something may turn up, or rather be turned up? Yes-
terday the justifying document was an illicit ration book, tomorrow it may be some 
suspect piece of literature." 
The second dissent voiced fears of "full impact of today's decision" (331 U.S. at 
194): 
"The principle established by the Court today can be used as easily by some future 
government determined to suppress political opposition under the guise of sedition as 
it can be used by a government determined to undo forgers and defrauders. . . . 
[It] takes no stretch of the imagination to picture law enforcement officers arresting 
those accused of believing, writing, or speaking that which is proscribed, accom-
panied by a thorough ransacking of their homes as an 'incident' to. the arrest in an 
effort to uncover 'anything' of a seditious nature." 
The third dissent pointed out (331 U.S. at 198): 
"In view of the readiness of zealots to ride roughshod over claims of privacy for 
any ends that impress them as socially desirable, we should not make inroads on the 
rights protected by this Amendment." 
236. Terminello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949), striking down an ordinance which im-
posed a fine of not more than two hundred dollars for a "breach of peace," defined 
by the trial court as misbehavior which "stirs the public to anger, invites dispute, 
brings about a condition of unrest, or creates a disturbance, or if it ·molests the 
inhabitants in the enjoyment of peace and quiet by arousing alarm.'' (337 U.S. at 3.) 
The Court ruled, per Douglas, J., that a conviction on any of the grounds charged 
could not stand. ''There is no room under our Constitution for a more restrictive 
view. For the alternative would lead to standardization of ideas either by legislatures, 
courts, or dominant political or community groups." (337 U.S. at 4-5.) The dissent-
ing opinion by Jackson, 337 U.S. 13-21, culls long passages from the speech in 
question. 
237. Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951), overturning a conviction and ten dollar 
fine for holding a religious meeting without a permit, defendant's permit having been 
revoked after a hearing by the police commissioner on evidence that he had ridiculed 
and denounced other religious beliefs at prior meetings. Samples of Kunz's prior 
preachings may be found in Jackson's dissenting opinion, 340 U.S. at 296. Kunz 
displayed a certain flair for bipartisanship; he also denounced Catholicism as "a 
religion of the devil" and the Pope as "The anti-Christ." Ibid. 
238. Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). 
239. 319 U.S. at 641. There was no majority opinion. Chief Justice Stone and Justice 
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Rutledge concurred in Justice Jackson's opinion; Justices Black and Douglas wrote a 
concurring opinion; and Justice Murphy wrote a separate concurring opinion. 
240. Ibid. 
241. U.S. at 644. 
242. 319 U.S. at 626. 
243. See, e.g., Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948). The point is made in rather 
homey fashion in Houts From Gun to Gavel: The Courtroom Recollections of James 
Mathers of Oklahoma, 1954, pp. 213-7. 
244. The phrases are those of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in United States v. 
Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 68-9 (1950). 
245. The phrase is Justice Jackson's dissenting in Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 295 
(1951). 
246. Perhaps this would not be true if the only purpose of punishment was to reform the 
criminal. But whatever ought to be the case, this obviously is not. "If it were, every 
prisoner should be released as soon as it appears clear that he will never repeat his 
offence, and if he is incurable he should not be punished at all." Holmes, supra 23, 
p. 42. 
247. Michael and Adler, Crime, Law and Social Science, 1933, p. 351. The authors con-
tinue, p. 352: 
''The end of the criminal law must be the common good, the welfare of a political 
society determined, of course, by reference to its constitution. Punishment can be 
justified only as an intermediate means to the ends of deterrence and reformation 
which, in turn, are means for increasing and preserving the welfare of society. " 
248. Holmes, supra 23, p. 44. 
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